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toward the question of equality in several ways. First, as Christian groups in the empire absorbed Western ideas of liberty and nationality, and as education and literacy increased among them, they complained more frequently and loudly about the lack of equality. Second, they found ready hearers among the several great powers who traditionally acted as protectors of Christians in the Near East and who, for mixed motives of humanitarianism and power politics, magnified the volume of these complaints in the Sublime Porte's ear and pressed for changes. Third, Ottoman statesmen who were concerned to check the territorial disintegration of the empire, and its internal decline, embarked on a program of reorganization and incipient westernization which inevitably brought them up against the same problem of equality as they moved to adopt or adapt elements of the Western state's political pattern. The question of the equality of Christian, Muslim, and Jew was by no means the major question faced by these statesmen, but it ran like a thread through many phases of the larger problem of Ottoman reform and westernization. Should Christians be given equal opportunity as students in the schools to be established in a reformed educational system? Should they be allowed to serve in a rejuvenated army? Should they be admitted to the highest administrative posts as the bureaucracy was improved? Should the contemplated revisions and codifications of law apply equally to Christian and Muslim? And, if any sort of representative government were established, whether on a provincial scale or in the form of a constitutional monarchy, should Christians be represented, and how?
It is, therefore, one of the most significant aspects of Ottoman history in the nineteenth century that the doctrine of equality did, in fact, become official policy. Sultan Mahmud II (I808-I839), who took some crucial steps toward reform in his own vigorous way, frequently made it plain that in his view all his subjects, of whatever creed, were equal.2 But it was during the Tanzimat period of I839 to I876, a new era in Ottoman efforts at reform and westernization, that the doctrine of the equality of Christian and Muslim was proclaimed in the most solemn manner and came to play a prominent role in the central question of Ottoman revival.3 2 See the convenient collection of such statements in Harold Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London, I936), PP. [40] [41] . 3 The doctrine of equality of course included Jews as well. But Christians were far more numerous in the empire and provided most of the problems. Among the 14,000,000 non-Muslims in an empire of some 35,000,000, Christians were an overwhelming majority. There were perhaps I50,000 Jews. All figures for the nineteenth century are inaccurate approximations. These follow Ubicini, I, I8-26. His estimates, probably low, have found the widest acceptance. For practical reasons, I shall limit the discussion to the status of Christians.
I
An imperial edict of reforms, the Hatt-i Sherif of Giilhane, opened the new era on November 3, I839.4 After public proclamation before an impressive assembly of diplomats and Ottoman notables, the edict was sworn to by the young sultan Abdul Medjid [Abdiilmecid] and his high officials in the room where the mantle of the prophet Muhammad was preserved. Much of the Hatt-i Sherif had a profoundly Muslim ring. It laid the decline of the empire directly to the nonobservance of "the precepts of the glorious Kuran." In the next breath it then attempted to reconcile Muslim tradition and progress, promising new institutions which should not contravene Muslim law but should conform to its demands. Security of life, honor, and property was guaranteed, along with reforms in taxing and conscription methods. But the Hatt-i Sherif was most remarkable neither for its Muslim overtones, for its promises of "life, liberty, and property," nor for its pledge to correct specific evils, though all this was important. The most novel aspect of the hatt arose from its official declaration of equality. "These imperial concessions," affirmed Abdul Medjid in his edict, "are extended to all our subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be."
The new policy was confirmed in a more extensive Hatt-i Humayun of I856, which promised equal treatment for adherents of all creeds in such specific matters as educational opportunity, appointment to government posts, and the administration of justice, as well as in taxation and military service.5 An interesting antidefamation clause was included also, forbidding "every distinction or designation tending to make any class whatever of the subjects of my Empire inferior to another class, on account of their religion, language, or race." Legal action would ensue against anyone, whether public official or private individual, who used "any injurious or offensive term." Even name-calling was forbidden in the name of equality.
At frequent intervals the theme was restated, with variations. Christians and Muslims were accepted together as students in the newly established imperial lyce'e of Galata Saray in I867. These and many other measures did something to raise the status of the non-Muslims of the empire, but the advance was slow and piecemeal. No genuine equality was ever attained.
Many European writers of the time, and many Western historians since, have dealt with the Tanzimat period, and the equality question that ran through it, in one of two ways. Some look on it from the outside as a phase of the Eastern Question, during which European diplomats in the service of their own national interests had constantly to prod the Ottoman government to live up to its professions of reform and equality, and to carry them out in a French, Russian, or English fashion. Others co1isi(ler it primarily as a phase of the long-continued internal decay of the empire, when all efforts to restore the "sick man" to health were unavailing. In either case, most writers have assumed the inability or the unwillingrness of the Turks to carry out any significant change. Turkish Attitudes and Christian-Muslim Equality 85 I helped to crystallize and precipitate reform projects already considered by responsible viziers, and also to induce a readier reception. The impact of crises on the Tanzimat statesmen was also, naturally, a strong influence on their attitudes toward equality, but their attitudes did not then fluctuate constantly.
Ali was the most conservative Muslim of the four and cautious in moving ahead with reform measures. His views, therefore, are probably the most significant gauge of the advance of attitudes among leading statesmen on Muslim-Christian equality. Ali believed firmly that the Ottoman Turk was best fitted to govern the conglomeration of peoples in the empire."3 He believed further that the prestige of this government rested on the prestige of Islam, against which he would allow no propaganda, though he was quite willing that Christians should enjoy freedom of belief and worship." But under the pressure of events, including both the rebellions of native Christians and the interventions of the great powers, Ali's views on the status of Christians changed slowly. In I867, when he was dealing with the rebellion in Crete, Ali wrote for the Sublime Porte a remarkable memorandum recommending a speedier application of the policy of equality. The Christians would cease to be revolutionaries, said Ali, as their hopes were fulfilled. Therefore they must be given every opportunity for education and tenure of public office, for which they were well fitted, even better prepared than Muslims generally at the moment. The Christians would then no longer regard themselves as hield in subjection by a Muslim state but as subjects of a monarch who protected all equally. "In short," concluded Ali, "the fusion of all subjects . . . with the exception of purely religious affairs . . . is the only means."15 There is no reason to question Ali's sincerity here, though it is obvious that he was pushed to his conclusions by the rush of events and not by thinking in a vacuum about the virtues of equality.
The other three statesmen came more easily to such opinions. Reshid was certainly influenced by a desire for praise for his liberal views from European courts but was apparently convinced that reforms which should guarantee equality to all peoples of the empire would ensure their devotion to the Ottoman government.16 Fuad expressed in a private memorandum his belief that the grant of liberties to the non-Muslim peoples of the empire would dull 13 What the four Tanzimat statesmen believed boiled down to this-that to save the empire, a new egalitarian citizenship and concept of patriotism, Osmanhlik or "Ottomanism," had to be created. Sometimes they expressed this as the "fusion," sometimes as the "brotherhood" of all Ottoman subjects. Official documents began to speak more of "imperial subjects," "subjects of the Sultanate," and "subjects of the Exalted [Ottoman] state," in a composite or collective sense, as if to convey a concept of Ottoman citizenship unbroken by millet boundaries."9 The idea of patriotism, or "compatriotism," was also expressed in the Hatt-i Humayun of i856.20 Though the statesmen knew that the concept of Osmanlilik was a break with the past, it is hard to say whether they fully realized what a tremendous revolution in traditional views was involved here, and what the logical outcome would be. They were not consciously trying to undermine the dominant position of the Muslim Turk. Yet by fostering an egalitarian citizenship, and by attempting to blur the demarcation lines between millet's, they were taking a significant step on the road to a purely secular concept of state and citizenship. A nationality law of I869, intended to combat the evils of the foreign protection of native Ottoman subjects, had also the effect of putting the acquisition and retention of citizenship on a purely territorial basis, unconnected with religion.2' When the I876 constitution specified that all peoples of the empire were to be called Osmanli, the unspoken corollary ran that henceforth their primary allegiance was to the state, and only secondarily were they Muslim, Jew, or Greek. 
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The ecclesiastical hierarchies that ruled the Christian millet's also opposed eqtuality. Osmanhilkt would both decrease their authority and lighten their purses. This was especially true of the Greek Orthodox hierarchy, which had the most extensive prerogatives and by far the largest flock. When the Hatt-i Sherif was solemnly read in I839 and then put back into its red satin pouch it is reported that the Greek Orthodox patriarch, who was present among the notables, said, "Infallah-God grant that it not be taken out of this bag again."25 In short, the doctrine of equality faced formidable opposition from Christians of the empire who were leaders in the churches and the nationalist movements. Ottoman brotherhood was only a remote possibility, if the Christians continued in these directions.
But equality and brotherhood had also to contend with the fundamental Turkish view of Christians. Not only the specific reactions of the Muslim Turks to the proclamations of equality but their basic attitudes toward Christians showed from the beginning that Osmanlilik would have hard sledding. The continuous interference of the great powers of Europe in Ottoman affairs also angered the Turks. These powers were all, of course, Christian by profession, if not in conduct. Russia, an enemy of long standing, was in a category by itself. But England and France also, despite the fact that they had assisted the empire with their armies in the Crimean War, and at other times with diplomatic pressure, were often detested because these services were overshadowed in the Turkish view by frequent and often high-handed interference. One such instance, which rankled particularly in connection with Muslim-Christian equality, was the fact that the Hatt-i Humayun of I856 was not purely an autochthonous edict, but that large parts of it had in effect been dictated by the British, French, and Austrian ambassadors. The British ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, had in many ways done great service for the Ottoman Empire, but in this period Ali three times asked London to recall him. Stratford would not allow the sultan to reign along with him, said Ali, and demanded that his own influence should be "so paramount and notorious" that the Porte lost prestige in the eyes of its own public.30 Years after Stratford had left Constantinople, Ali still spoke of him with real hatred.3' Fuad, who with his social graces, fluent French, and Europeanized witticisms got along well with foreign diplomats, nevertheless voiced almost the identical criticism of a sympathetic French ambassador, M. Bourree, because "the French will never be satisfied with giving friendly advice in an unassuming way; ... whatever good thing was done must be advertised as a benefit conferred by France...." 32 Foreign interference rankled particularly when it was based on the capitulatory privileges which the great powers stretched and abused. Many ordinary Turks became aware of this when they saw the support given by Christian diplomats and consuls to thousands of proteges, largely Ottoman Christians who had never seen their protecting country but who were shielded against the taxes and courts of their own state and were often granted foreign passports. Many of the proteges were decidedly shady char- Events which followed the two great reform proclamations serve to illustrate the general antipathy to their promises of equality. One example is related to the touchy question of military service. Both in I839 and i856 the sultan proclaimed that his Christian subjects should be equally privileged to serve in the armed forces along with the Muslims, instead of paying an exemption tax as they had previously done. It soon became obvious that the Christians would rather continue to pay than serve, despite the step toward equality which military service might mean. It also became obvious that the Turks wanted Christians to be equally liable to service so far as sharing the burdens and dangers went but balked at giving the Christians equal opportunity for promotion to the officer corps. Muslim Turks did not want to serve under native Christian officers. In theory the equal right to serve in the armed forces remained, but in fact the whole matter was quietly buried, and the old exemption tax reappeared under a different name. Both Turks and Christians were satisfied to see the inequality continue. 39 Another illustration of Turkish reactions is found in the experience of the considerable group of American Congregational missionaries in the empire. 
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